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This paper takes as its context the decision of the Solicitors Regulation Authority in England and Wales to 
abandon before the event regulation of lower court trial advocacy.  Although solicitors will continue to acquire 
rights of audience on qualification, they will no longer be required to undertake training or assessment in 
witness examination, by contrast with other, competing, legal professions.  Their opportunities to acquire 
competence outside the classroom will remain limited. The paper first explores this context and its implications 
for the three key factors of rights to perform, competence and regulatory accountability.  The current regulatory 
system is then displayed as a Hohfeldian network of rights and duties held in tension between stakeholders 
intended to inhibit the incompetent exercise of rights to conduct trial advocacy.  The SRA’s proposal weakens 
this tension field and threatens the competitive position of solicitors.  The paper therefore finally offers a radical 
alternative reconceptualisation of rights of audience in terms of Waldron’s ‘responsibility rights’ as a solution, 
albeit one with significant implications for the individual advocate.  This model, applicable globally, is closer to 
notions of societal good and professionalism than to those of the competitive market, whilst inhibiting 
incompetent performance and remediating the SRA’s approach.   
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The legal services market in England and Wales possesses two peculiarities. One is its plethora of legal 
professions.1 The other is an attenuated concept of ‘practice of law’ confined under the Legal Services Act 2007 
(the Act) to six ‘reserved’ activities.2   This article proposes a reconceptualization of one of these: the right of 
audience.  It uses the rights theories of Hohfeld and Waldron to interrogate three critical interlocking factors:  
a) ‘rights’ to perform;  
b) acquisition of competence; and  
c) regulatory accountability during (DTE)3 or after the event (ATE).   
In the existing model these are parcelled out between stakeholders in an interlocking tension field that lends 
itself to a Hohfeldian analysis. The novel analysis in this paper, however, offers a reconceptualization of rights 
of audience as one of Waldron’s ‘responsibility rights’ that combines, rather than separates, those key factors.  
This reconceptualization is needed urgently, given the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s (SRA’s) proposal to 
abandon mandatory before the event (BTE) education and assessment of witness examination for solicitors.  It is 
nevertheless generalisable to all advocates as a more robust means of guarding against incompetent advocacy.4 
The ‘right of audience’ is defined by the Act as the right to ‘appear before and address a court, including the 
right to call and examine witnesses’;5 that is, the right to be ‘heard’ by a judge.  Even Mayson, a strong critic of 
the rationale for the statutory six, acknowledges the logic of regulating this public good activity, which presents 
different, and possibly greater, risks than the others.6 Advocacy is ‘an area of practice where people are often 
 
1 Regulated under the Legal Services Act 2007: barristers, Chartered Legal Executives, costs lawyers, licensed 
conveyancers, notaries, patent attorneys, solicitors, trade mark attorneys and some accountancy professions.   
2 Legal Services Act 2007, s 12.  Immigration services are separately reserved by Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999, s 84. 
3 The code of conduct can be treated as DTE, as can continuing education and judicial control: Competition and 
Markets Authority Legal Services Market Study: Final Report (2016) available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5887374d40f0b6593700001a/legal-services-market-study-final-
report.pdf, para 4.3. 
4 This taxonomy was used in Competition and Markets Authority, ibid, para 6.23 and was subsequently adopted 
by Mayson: S Mayson The Form of Legal Services Regulation, Working Paper LSR-4 (2020) available at 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ethics-law/sites/ethics-law/files/irlsr_wp_lsr-4_form_final.pdf. 
5 Legal Services Act 2007, Schedule 2, 3(1) (subject to historical provisions in ss 3(2)). 
6 S Mayson Reforming Legal Services: Regulation beyond the Echo Chambers (2020) available at 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ethics-law/sites/ethics-law/files/irlsr_final_report_final_0.pdf, p 51.  Mayson reviews 
earlier reports coming to the same conclusion in The Scope of Legal Services Regulation Working Paper LSR-2 
(2020) available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ethics-law/sites/ethics-law/files/irlsr_wp_lsr-2_scope_final.pdf, paras 
5.83, 5.88 and p 15ff. 
 
 
vulnerable and the stakes are high’.7 The logic of treating it as a reserved activity necessarily entails the state 
managing the risk.  It does so by assuring it is performed to a minimum level of competence, the threshold for 
which might be high, and that there is accountability for failure to meet it.  In England and Wales the ultimate 
accountability is, via the individual regulators, to the Legal Services Board (LSB) created by the Act.  However, 
the principle that only ‘lawyers’ are enabled to carry out the task on behalf of others is an international norm, at 
least in the common law world where the adversarial oral tradition intensifies the risk. 
Clearly, not all forms of advocacy in all kinds of hearing are objectively of equal risk.  Its highest risk aspect, 
and the specific focus of this paper, appears in the final clause of the definition.  This describes the key function 
of the advocate in an adversarial trial: witness examination.  Poor witness examination in any court has the 
capacity to impact adversely on litigants’ livelihood, family, liberty and, in some jurisdictions, life.  More 
legally significant trials are reserved to the higher courts where rights of audience are, for solicitors, more 
sparingly granted.8  However, the vast majority of Anglo-Welsh criminal trials are held in the magistrates’ 
courts, with substantial potential for adverse impact on defendants and victims. Here, solicitors carry out most of 
the advocacy.9 Advocacy is a significant societal good and licensure to perform it is of considerable reputational 
and financial advantage to individual lawyers.  Pressure to take on such work when a lawyer is not competent to 
do so (or does not know whether or not they are) might, therefore, be considerable.  The advocacy literature 
focuses on education, practice and strategy and on ethics.10  There is some discussion of the extent to which any 
profession, or quasi-profession, might have a claim to the right (in particular in the higher courts),.11  There is 
 
7 The SRA chief executive: Solicitors Regulation Authority, ‘Ensuring High Standards in Solicitor Advocacy’ 
Solicitors Regulation Authority (28 July 2020) <https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/news/press/high-standards-solicitor-
advocacy/ accessed 11 November 2020. 
8 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Higher Rights of Audience’ Solicitors Regulation Authority (19 June 2009) 
available at https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/accreditation/higher-rights-of-audience 
9 B Jeffrey Independent Criminal Advocacy in England and Wales (2014) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310712/jeffrey-review-criminal-
advocacy.pdf, para 1.8.  See also Dyson MR’s comments on the argument made in R. (on the application of 
Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board, [2014] EWCA Civ 1276, [2014] H.R.L.R. 29 at para 22.  It was suggested 
that the effect on barristers of failing to pass the higher court QASA assessments (below, ns 50-53), ‘means that, 
for practical purposes, barristers will not be able to practise at all, since practice in the magistrates' court is now 
for the most part undertaken by solicitors. The answer …. is that it is intrinsic to any such scheme that advocates 
who fail the assessment should be prohibited from practising. The whole point of an assessment scheme is to 
weed out incompetent practitioners’. 
10 See A Boon and J Flood ‘Trials of Strength: The Reconfiguration of Litigation as a Contested Terrain’ (1999) 
33 Law and Society Review 595; L C Harris ‘The Emotional Labour of Barristers: An Exploration of Emotional 
Labour By Status Professionals’ (2002) 39 Journal of Management Studies 553; W C McMahon III ‘Declining 
Professionalism in Court: A Comparative Look at the English Barrister’ (2006) 19 Georgetown Journal of Legal 
Ethics 845; R Moorhead and others The Ethical Capacities of New Advocates (2015) available at 
https://tinyurl.com/y647nfyx; D Neuberger Ethics and Advocacy in the Twenty-First Century (2016) available at 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-160615.pdf. 
11 See D Napley ‘Rights of Audience’ (1984) 17 Bracton Law Journal 2; M Zander ‘Rights of Audience in the 
Higher Courts in England and Wales since the 1990 Act: What Happened’ (1997) 4 International Journal of the 
 
 
discussion of regulation and regulatory models.12 There are multiple reports on quality of performance.13 What 
is missing is not only consideration of the interaction of the various factors and stakeholders, but a more 
fundamental analysis of the nature of the right itself. In particular, how lawyers not competent to act are 
restrained from acting in the first place, rather than sanctioned after the harm has been done.   
The risk is that framing this activity as a ‘right’ encourages it to be seen as an absolute entitlement, to be 
zealously guarded by individuals and the different professions.  This detaches it from being contingent on 
competence.  The distinction between the two is placed into context in England and Wales by a radical change 
to the qualification system for solicitors.  The right to appear in a criminal trial in the magistrates’ court or a 
civil trial in the county court is, at present, automatically conferred on every solicitor on the day they qualify. 
This is reinforced by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) competence statement which includes the 
ability to ‘[deal] with witnesses appropriately’14 as an expectation of every solicitor at the point of qualification.  
The right, with a DTE obligation to maintain that standard,15 is then retained by the 195,821 practising 
solicitors16 for the remainder of their careers unless a ‘condition on practice’ removing the right is imposed on 
them as an ATE sanction.17   
 
Legal Profession 167; A Rodger ‘Rights of Audience: A Scottish Perspective’ (1993) 8 Denning Law Journal 1; 
R Kerridge and G Davis ‘Reform of the Legal Profession: An Alternative “Way Ahead”’ (1999) 62 Modern 
Law Review 807. 
12 See for example, Mayson Reforming Legal Services: Regulation beyond the Echo Chambers, above, n 6 and 
sources cited therein.   
13 See A Devereux and others Quality Assurance for Advocates (2009) available at 
http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/10490/1/QAA_Final_Report_November_2009.pdf; Human Assets Quality Assurance 
for Advocates: Research Report (2011) available at https://tinyurl.com/y3sne3d4 ; ORC International 
Perceptions of Criminal Advocacy Report (2012) available at https://tinyurl.com/yxg5zc5w; B Jeffrey above, n 
9; Ministry of Justice Preserving and Enhancing the Quality of Criminal Advocacy (2015) available at 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/enhancing-the-quality-of-criminal-
advocacy/supporting_documents/consultationpaper.pdf; G Hunter, J Jacobson and A Kirby Judicial Perceptions 
of the Quality of Criminal Advocacy: Report of Research Commissioned by the Solicitors Regulation Authority 
and the Bar Standards Board (2018) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-we-work/reports/criminal-
advocacy.page; Solicitors Regulation Authority Criminal Advocacy: Thematic Review (No date) available at 
https://www.sra.org.uk/globalassets/documents/sra/research/criminal-advocacy-thematic-review.pdf; Solicitors 
Regulation Authority Advocacy in the Solicitors Profession (2019) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/how-
we-work/reports/advocacy-in-the-solicitors-profession/. 
14 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Statement of Solicitor Competence’ Solicitors Regulation Authority (25 
November 2019) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/resources/cpd/competence-statement/. 
15 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Continuing Competence and Our Competence Statement’ (25 November 
2019) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/resources/cpd/tool-kit/resources/use-competence-statement/. 
16 Law Society of England and Wales, ‘Annual Statistics Report 2019’ Law Society of England and Wales 
(October 2020) available at https://tinyurl.com/y3a9pdaz. 
17 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Competence and Standard of Service’ Solicitors Regulation Authority (25 
November 2019) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/corporate-strategy/sub-strategies/enforcement-
practice/competence-standard-service/, rules 3.2 and 3.3 
 
 
At present, all aspiring solicitors are required to undergo BTE education in advocacy, including witness 
examination, before they qualify.  This at least has some pretension to permit them to acquire competence, or, at 
least, awareness of the significance of the task.  The SRA’s recently approved proposals abandon this in favour 
of a single centralised assessment in two parts (Solicitors Qualification Examination, SQE) from the autumn of 
2021.18  SQE 2 includes advocacy but will exclude witness examination.  This despite influential views that the 
highest risk legal activities merit BTE, as well as DTE and ATE, regulation.19 Recent consultation by the SRA 
discussed below, makes it clear that control over solicitors’ advocacy standards in lower court trials is now to be 
achieved only through the Standards and Regulations 201920 (DTE) and their enforcement processes (ATE).21  
These place the responsibility to act only if competent on individual solicitors and their employers.  It is not 
unusual for professional competence statements and codes of conduct to refer to such a responsibility, although 
the SRA is unusual in the vigour with which it embeds the competence statement into its own disciplinary 
strategy.  Incompetence becomes, therefore, an ethical and not just a malpractice issue.  The SRA does so, 
however, whilst depriving those solicitors of any mandatory BTE education on which to base their evaluation of 
competence. This is true of other niche areas of solicitors’ practice, but of no others that are simultaneously 
reserved activities, frequently high risk, and consciously included in the competence statement.   
There is therefore a serious question about whether the new model can prevent solicitors performing witness 
examination incompetently, even if it is effective at ATE punishment. Only a fundamental reconceptualization 
of the right of audience, prioritising personal responsibility for competence over entitlement to act as an integral 
part of the right itself, can effectively address that question.   
In order fully to understand the significance of both the SRA’s plans and the need to reconceptualise rights of 
audience more fundamentally, it is necessary to consider each of three key factors: rights, competence and 
regulatory accountability.  The way in which they interact separate competence from rights and accountability in 
a way that Hohfeld would, as we will see, describe as molecular.  It is assumed that the three factors, each 
 
18 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Solicitors Qualifying Examination’ (May 2020) available at 
http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/policy/sqe.page; Legal Services Board, ‘Decision Notice: The Solicitors Regulation 
Authority Rule Change Application for Approval of Alterations to Its Regulatory Arrangements Relating to the 
Solicitors Qualifying Examination’ (2020) available at https://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/20201027-Decision-Notice-SQE.pdf. 
19 For example, Competition and Markets Authority, above n 3, para 6.24; Mayson, above n 6, p 96. 
20 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘SRA Standards and Regulations 2019’ (25 November 2019) available at 
https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/standards-regulations 
21 Solicitors Regulation Authority Assuring Advocacy Standards:  Analysis of Consultation Responses (2020) 
available at https://www.sra.org.uk/globalassets/documents/sra/consultations/assuring-advocacy-standards---
consultation-analysis-sumamry?version=495084, paras 14-16. 
 
 
separately controlled by different stakeholders, hold each other in check, keeping, as it were, the table steady. 
This paper proposes that the table should, rather, have a single, central, solid leg.   
 
CONTEXT: THE PLETHORA OF PROFESSIONS AND THE DEREGULATED LANDSCAPE  
Although it is argued that rights of audience need to be reconceptualised in any event, the stakes are 
significantly higher for the SRA.  Any difference in infrastructure – such as the SQE – that can be perceived as 
weakening a profession’s claim to a reserved activity will be exploited by the others clamouring for the same 
work. The heterogeneity of the competitive market highlights differences – real or assumed – in a way that 
Hohfeld would recognise.  It is therefore first important to understand how the state has come to this divisive 
position.   
Much has changed since the position noted by Burrage where barristers and solicitors acted to reduce their 
respective remits, limiting themselves to work that each profession felt was honourable and reinforced its claim 
to professional status.22 The Act’s directive to ‘promot[e] competition in the provision of services’23 mandates 
competition not only within, but also between, professions. It is therefore in the interests of each profession to 
enable its members to carry out as much work of as many different ‘reserved’ kinds as possible and to exclude 
others by aggressive branding and the operation of market forces.24  
Practitioners and their regulators must also, however, obey the Act’s other objectives including ‘encouraging an 
independent, strong, diverse and legal profession’. The use of the singular ‘profession’ is ironic in the light of 
the mandate to compete.  There has not been a single legal profession in England and Wales since the medieval 
notaries were joined by the 14th century Common Bench. Solicitors emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries. The 
early inter-profession negotiation noted by Burrage resulted in the solicitors’ monopoly over conveyancing (real 
 
22 M Burrage ‘From a Gentlemen’s to a Public Profession: Status and Politics in the History of English 
Solicitors’ (1996) 3 International Journal of the Legal Profession 45. 
23 Legal Services Act 2007, s 1(1)(e). 
24 See, for example, R Moorhead ‘Bar Standards Board’s “research” Is Crass and Deeply Flawed’ (The 
Guardian 23 April 2012) available at https://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/apr/23/solicitor-advocates-
research-flawed; M Walters, ‘'Culture of Attacks’ on Solicitor Advocates’ (Law Society Gazette 14 October 
2016) available at http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/culture-of-attacks-on-solicitor-
advocates/5058319.fullarticle.  The point is made more explicitly in the recent LSB report: ‘Falling levels of 
crime at the same time as growth in the potential pool of advocates has created a situation where a larger group 
of practitioners is competing for less work. …the duty solicitor scheme, which acts as the main gateway to an 
advocate, gives solicitors’ firms a commercial advantage. There is a trend of solicitors firms keeping more work 
in-house’. Legal Services Board, ‘The State of Legal Services 2020 Evidence Compendium’ Legal Services 
Board (2020) available at https://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/The-State-of-
Legal-Services-Evidence-Compendium-FINAL.pdf, p 86. 
 
 
property transactions) and the Bar’s position as referral-only advocacy specialists.25 Other professions 
followed.26 The onset of the competitive environment is most strikingly marked by the creation in the mid-1980s 
of the licensed conveyancer profession, specifically to break the solicitors’ conveyancing monopoly.27  A series 
of reports attacking legal monopolies from 2001 onwards28 resulted in the Act.  
The result is that rights of audience are possessed under the Act by all barristers, all costs lawyers, some legal 
executives, all patent attorneys, all solicitors and all trade mark attorneys, although in the case of all but the Bar 
and solicitors, restricted to particular areas of law (see table 1).  The extent to which there is a supporting BTE 
infrastructure to equip members of those professions with the competence to perform adequately – by contrast 
with an ATE regulatory accountability that punishes for lack of competence – varies considerably.  The focus is, 
again, on heterogeneity and on the separation of the three key factors.  In the context of the SRA’s plans, this 
fine categorisation of rights also serves to limit the circumstances in which aspiring solicitors, deprived of 
mandatory BTE education, can acquire competence (and awareness of what competence entails) by experiential 
learning in the workplace.   
 
THE FIRST KEY FACTOR: RIGHTS TO PERFORM 
The heterogeneity in regulation of rights of audience began with Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, s 2729 
which permitted ‘authorised bodies’ to grant rights of audience to their members.  Section 32 recognised the 
existing rights of solicitors and their clerks30 in the lower courts and s 33 those of barristers.  More 
controversially, however, solicitors were granted the opportunity to acquire rights in the higher, Crown Court, 
by s 67 and the (then) immunity of advocates from claims in negligence and contract was extended to non-
 
25 Burrage, above n 22 p 55. 
26 The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys in 1882 quickly followed by the Association of Solicitors’ 
Managing Clerks (now the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives).  What is now the Chartered Institute of 
Trade Mark Attorneys appeared in 1934 and what is now the Association of Costs Lawyers was founded in the 
1970s.   
27 Administration of Justice Act 1985, s 32.  See F H Stephen, J H Love and A A Paterson, ‘Deregulation of 
Conveyancing Markets in England and Wales’ (1994) 15 Fiscal Studies 102. 
28 Office of Fair Trading Competition in Professions (2001) available at https://tinyurl.com/y492sa3x; 
Department for Constitutional Affairs Competition and Regulation in the Legal Services Market A Report 
Following the Consultation ‘In the Public Interest?’ (2003) available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/general/oftreptconc.htm; D 
Clementi Report of the Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England and Wales (2004) 
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.legal-services-review.org.uk/. 
29 The pre-1990 position is summarised in Lord Chancellor’s Department Legal Services: A Framework for the 
Future Cm 740, 1989.  The processes were refined by the subsequent Access to Justice Act 1999, ss 36-43.   
30 Hansard HC Deb, vol 177, cols 597-600, 25 July 1990.  
 
 
barrister advocates by s 62.31  The Bar, as might be expected, fought a considerable battle against this incursion 
into its territory.32  
The Act follows a similar model.  Each of the six regulators listed in Schedule 4 may cause its members to be 
‘authorised’ persons and exercise rights of audience in accordance with its own remit and regulations, overseen 
by the LSB. 
In addition to mandating competition, then, and facilitating the different regulators in developing their own BTE 
training and licensing requirements, codes of conduct and continuing education systems (DTE) and disciplinary 
procedures (ATE), the Act further fractures rights of audience into the following categories: 
i) judicial model;  
ii) venue (for example, in open court or in chambers);  
iii) seniority of court;  
iv) the nature of the hearing;33  
v) field of law; and 
combinations of all of these.  The Act defines and controls the distribution of the right but says nothing explicit 
about competence or the relative risk of each category.  It is the regulators who determine who is licensed and 
what BTE education they require.  Judges do not themselves sanction weak advocates except through the wasted 
costs process, 34 but may refer to a regulator, who can. There is, however, evidence that some judges do not feel 
this is effective, whilst others believe that it is for the market to discriminate against weak advocates.35  
In the interstices of this regulatory maze, it is important to understand how limited the circumstances will be in 
which aspiring solicitors can develop towards competence once the BTE requirement has gone.36  First, the 
Act’s reservation of rights of audience does not apply to tribunals or to arbitration.  Tribunal litigants can be 
 
31 The immunity was abolished by the House of Lords in Arthur J S Hall & Co (A Firm) v Simons; Woolf 
Seddon (A Firm) v Barrett; Roberts & Hill (A Firm) v Harris (conjoined appeals) [2002] 1 AC 615, discussed in 
M Seneviratne ‘The Rise and Fall of Advocates’ Immunity’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 644.  
32 See above, n 11. 
33 A proposal to allow all solicitors to have rights to appear in the Crown Court but only where there would be 
no trial was contentious: C Baksi ‘Bar Says No to Plea-Only Advocates’ (Law Society Gazette 2012) available 
at https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/bar-says-no-to-plea-only-advocates/67795.article. 
34 See, although it predated the abolition of advocates’ immunity, Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] EWCA Civ 40, 
[1994] Ch 205, especially the comments by Lord Bingham at p 236 on the difficulty of objectively criticising 
the decisions made by an advocate ‘in the fog of war’.  
35 Hunter, Jacobson and Kirby, above n 13, para 5.2.2. 
36 Opportunities to develop post-licensure are also limited: ibid pp 33-34.  
 
 
represented in final hearings where witness examination takes place by students and trainees.37 Few will have 
such opportunities. 
Second, as supervised ‘assistants’ of regulated lawyers, 38 trainees are ‘exempt persons’ when they appear in 
some chambers hearings.  This will not normally include witness examination.  
A third possibility could provide experience of witness examination in court trials although, again, opportunities 
will be scarce.  Its regulatory model also, to some extent, blends right to act, competence to act, and 
accountability in the way advocated by this paper.  The court has power under the Act to hear otherwise 
unauthorised or non-exempt advocates on a case by case basis.39 Although the ‘right of audience’ is in concept a 
right vis á vis a court, these are the only circumstances where the right is actually within the gift of the court.  In 
the absence of conventional methods of holding poor advocates to account through regulators or insurance, 40 
the risk is controlled by this limitation to the case at hand.  In simple cases, where an articulate volunteer41 helps 
out as a ‘McKenzie Friend,’42 this is uncontroversial.  There is, however, a cadre of professional McKenzie 
Friends, operating commercially or in the interests of a pressure group.43 Some may have received BTE 
training.44 In order to maintain their business, they may seek to use permission granted in one case as leverage to 
be granted rights in others.45  Consequently rights will only be granted to a repeat or ‘professional’ McKenzie 
Friend in exceptional circumstances.46  An important criterion in this treatment has been an unfavourable 
 
37 The Free Representation Unit, a charity which trains volunteer tribunal advocates, does so under the strapline 
‘Providing free legal representation for the public and advocacy experience for junior lawyers’: Free 
Representation Unit, ‘Can FRU Help You?’ Free Representation Unit (2009) available at 
http://www.thefru.org.uk/can-fru-help-you. 
38 Legal Services Act 2007, Sch 3, para 1(7).  
39 Ibid, para 1(2). 
40 Ameyaw v McGoldrick [2020] EWHC 1741 (QB), [2020] 7 WLUK 14. 
41 Sometimes lawyers in good standing without rights in the relevant court are permitted to appear on this basis: 
Clarkson v Gilbert [2000] 6 WLUK 299.  A lawyer stripped of the right by the regulator will not be permitted to 
appear: Azumi Ltd v Zuma’s Choice Pet Products Ltd; Vanderbilt v Wallace [2017] EWHC 45 (IPEC), [2017] 
WLUK 170. 
42 McKenzie v McKenzie [1971] P 33. 
43 Discussed in G Vos, Supreme Court Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2019), section 13.  See also 
Practice Note (Sen Cts: McKenzie Friends: Civil and Family Courts) [2010] WLR 1881, applied by Steyn J at 
[59]-[68] in Ameyaw v McGoldrick above, n 40. 
44 Perhaps part-trained in one of the regulated professions, or through a specialist training organisation.  See for 
example, McKenzie Friend Family and Civil Court Support ‘McKenzie Friend Training : Become a McKenzie 
Friend’ McKenzie Friend Family and Civil Court Support (2020) available at 
http://www.mckenziefrienduk.net/mckenziefriendtraining.htm, offered by an organisation whose expressed aim 
is ‘to take family law out of the hands of solicitors’. 
45 See R (on the application of Koli) v Maidstone Crown Court [2011] 5 WLUK 171. 
46 See re N [2008] EWHC 2042 (Fam), [2008] 1 WLR 2743; Francis v Barton Bridging Capital Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 1525 (Ch), [2010] 4 WLUK 572; Durkan v Madden [2013] EWHC 4409 (Ch), [2013] WLUK 300, 
Bezeliansky v Bezelianska [2016] NI Ch 1. 
 
 
contrast with the mandatory BTE training undergone by authorised advocates from which competence is 
inferred: 
 
It is desirable that members of the public, … know that they are briefing a representative who 
has been properly trained and approved by an appropriate accredited professional body. … 
To permit any person unknown to the Court with no legal training and no professional 
accreditation to represent a litigant may be unfair to the litigant, unfair to the other parties 
and unfair to the Court.47 [my italics] 
 
Under the new regime, as we shall see in the next section, the training and competence of newly qualified 
solicitors in lower court witness examination will be no less variable between individuals than it is for 
McKenzie Friends.  The other authorised professions have kept responsibility for BTE competence in the hands 
of the regulator. If the courts retain the test above, these professions will have a far greater claim – what 
Waldron might would describe as an ‘interest’ – than solicitors to be distinguishable from McKenzie Friends.    
The next section demonstrates the divergence in the place of acquisition of competence in the regulatory system 
between the different professions as a precursor to the theoretical reconceptualization advocated in this paper.  
 
THE SECOND KEY FACTOR:  ACQUISITION OF COMPETENCE 
A rational response to society’s recognition of the risk inherent in trial advocacy is to dedicate a particular kind 
of BTE training, assessment and DTE and ATE regulation to it.48  This could be achieved either by confining it 
to those professions who undertake to train their members (regulation by title) or independently licensing 
individuals to perform it (regulation by activity), possibly using a homogenous set of standards or competences.  
Even Mayson, arguing for radical review in legal services regulation, sees a role for the professional titles.49  He 
is, however, far more interested in regulation of activities, particularly of those, amongst which he counts 
advocacy and litigation, that are of higher risk.  This combination of competing professions and regulation by 
 
47 Pierre Izzo v Philip Ross & Co (A Firm), [2001] 7 WLUK 802 per Neuberger J.  
48 Sometimes DTE obligations require participation in advocacy-related CPD, but this is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
49 Mayson Reforming Legal Services: Regulation beyond the Echo Chambers above, n 6, p 182. 
 
 
activity does not have a happy history.  In 2013 there was an attempt to achieve homogeneity in criminal court 
advocacy for barristers, Chartered Legal Executives and solicitors by assessment leading to licensure for 
different levels of court and complexity of case.  This failed, at least arguably due to inter-professional 
competition.50  It was sufficiently controversial to go to the Supreme Court51 and finally expired in 201852 with 
the LSB promising to hold individual regulators to account in the future for managing the risks.53 
What remains then is demonstrative of the deliberate competitive environment and the legislative history 
continued under the Act where regulation is largely by title.  Considerable emphasis is placed on BTE training 
and assessment, mandated and quality assured by the relevant regulator.  The way in which this is managed, 
however, demonstrates divergence and heterogeneity.  This is mapped in Table 1.  The complexity with which 
responsibility for the three key factors is allocated to different actors lends itself to a Hohfeldian analysis, with 
which we can subsequently compare the more coherent Waldronian alternative.   
 
50 Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates ‘QASA Handbook for Criminal Advocates’ Quality Assurance 
Scheme for Advocates (2015) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/globalassets/documents/sra/consultations/qasa-
app2.pdf?version=4a1ab8. 
51 R (on the application of Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board, [2015] UKSC 41, [2016] A.C. 697.  The argument 
was that the LSB had failed to give proper attention to the risk that assessment in vivo by judges would 
compromise the ‘independence’ of barristers by pressurising them to curry favour with the assessing judge, to 
the detriment of the needs of the client. 
52 M Walters ‘LSB to Monitor Advocacy Standards as QASA Is Finally Killed Off’ Law Society Gazette (20 
August 2018) available at https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/lsb-to-monitor-advocacy-standards-as-qasa-is-
finally-killed-off/5067286.article. 
53 Legal Services Board ‘Decision Notice The Bar Standards Board (BSB) Application for the Approval of 
Amendments to the BSB Handbook to Remove the Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates (Criminal) 
(‘QASA’) Rules’ Legal Services Board (2018) available at 
https://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_do/regulation/pdf/2018/QASA_Decision_Notice_140818.pdf; 
‘Decision Notice: The Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) Rule Change Application for Approval of 
Alterations to Regulatory Arrangements to Remove Its Quality Assurance for Advocates (Crime) Regulations 





Table 1: patterns of regulatory governance of competence in witness examination 




Rights prior to full 
licensure 
Extent of rights 











Academic study + 
strongly advocacy 
focused vocational 
course + 1 year work 
experience 
(‘pupillage’) 
A group of academic 
providers working to a 
curriculum set by the 
regulator.  Some 
centralised assessment 
(but not in 
advocacy)55 
Limited rights of 
audience after first six 
months of pupillage.56   
Rights in all courts of 
England and Wales, in 
both interim hearings 
and trials and in 
principle in any area 
of law (i) to v) above)  
Specialist ‘tickets’ are 
available representing 
specialisms in eg 
serious sexual 
offences or murder 
cases 
Bar Standards Board 
Fellows of Chartered 









A group of academic 
providers working to a 
curriculum set by the 
regulator.  Work 
experience is assessed 
by the regulator 
Rjghts in interim hearings as an ‘exempt 
person’ if supervised by a solicitor (ii above) 
Can obtain rights in 




above) by portfolio + 
36 hour/6 day course 
and assessment58  
CILEx Regulation 
Costs lawyers Sequence of 
academic/vocational 
Single academic 
provider working to a 
Rjghts in interim 
hearings as an 
Rights in all courts in 
England and Wales (i) 
 Costs Lawyer 
Standards Board 
 
54 Bar Council of England and Wales, ‘What Is the Bar?’ Bar Council of England and Wales (2019) available at https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/about-the-bar/what-is-the-
bar/#:~:targetText=The%20Bar%20of%20England%20and,the%20outcome%20of%20a%20case.. 
55 Changes are in train to the structure of the vocational course but do not impact on the argument in this paper: Bar Standards Board, ‘Becoming a Barrister: An Overview’ 
Bar Standards Board (2020) available at https://www.barcouncil.org.uk/about-the-bar/what-is-the-
bar/#:~:targetText=The%20Bar%20of%20England%20and,the%20outcome%20of%20a%20case.. 
56 Bar Standards Board, ‘The Bar Qualification Manual’ Bar Standards Board (2019) available at https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/training-qualification/bar-
qualification-manual.html2.10 
57 Chartered Institute of Legal Executives, ‘How to Qualify as a Chartered Legal Executive Lawyer’ Chartered Institute of Legal Executives (No date) available at 
https://www.cilex.org.uk/membership/getting_qualified.aspx#:~:text=How%20to%20Qualify%20as%20a%20Chartered%20Legal%20Executive,Diploma%20for%20Law%
20and%20GDL%20Graduates%20who%20wish. 








Rights prior to full 
licensure 
Extent of rights 








studied in parallel 
with work 
experience.59  Specific 
module on Advocacy 
and Negotiation60 
 
curriculum set by the 
regulator. 
‘exempt person’ if 
supervised (ii above) 
– iv) above) involving 
the calculation, 
evidencing and 
recovery of legal fees 
(v) above)  
Patent attorneys Sequence of 
examinations 
normally taken in 









centrally set by entity 
attached to regulator 
Rjghts in interim 
hearings as an 
‘exempt person’ if 
supervised (ii above) 
With a Litigation 
Skills certificate right 




Patents County Court) 
and in some appeals in 
the Patents Court, 
both technically parts 
of the High Court (iii) 
and v) above)  
Can obtain a Higher 
Courts Advocacy 
Certificate permitting 
them to appear in all 
other courts in 
intellectual property 
matters (iii) and v) 
above).62   
Intellectual Property 
Regulation Board 
Trade mark attorneys Academic study + 
vocational course 
normally undertaken 
in parallel with 
workplace experience 
Two academic 
providers for the 
academic study and 
one for the vocational 
course working to a 
curriculum set by the 
regulator. 
Rjghts in interim 
hearings as an 
‘exempt person’ if 
supervised (ii above) 




Patents County Court) 
and in some appeals in 
the Patents Court, 
both technically parts 
 
59 Association of Costs Lawyers, ‘Qualifying as a Costs Lawyer’ Association of Costs Lawyers (No date) available at 
https://www.associationofcostslawyers.co.uk/Qualifying-as-a-Costs-Lawyer. 
60 ACL Training, ‘Costs Lawyer Qualification 2020 Prospectus,’ ACL Training (2019) available at 
https://www.associationofcostslawyers.co.uk/write/MediaUploads/ACLT%20Regulations/2020_PROSPECTUS_v2.0.pdf. 
61 Patent Examination Board, ‘Patent Examination Board Litigation Skills Syllabus’, Patent Examination Board(2016) available at https://www.cipa.org.uk/patent-
examination-board/support/syllabi-for-2020/. 
62 Intellectual Property Regulation Board Rights To Conduct Litigation And Rights Of Audience And Other Reserved Legal Activities Certification Rules 2012. 
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includes the Litigation 
Skills Certificate.63 









Table 1: patterns of regulatory governance of competence in witness examination 
Table 1 demonstrates that the national model for equipping lawyers with both information about the skill and 
baseline competence in it  – mirrored in the other UK nations and in many other Commonwealth countries – is 
for advocacy to be a component, and, in the case of barristers, an overwhelming component, of a BTE 
vocational course.  The responsibility for this is, however, spread across different stakeholders.  The resource-
intensive simulation experience is delivered by course providers (often universities) and they (normally) assess, 
subject to regulation and quality assurance by the regulator and financing by the student.64  This simulation, 
coupled with further exposure in the workplace, is then supplemented by ATE sanction.  An additional sanction 
may be a claim by the client in tort or contract.  Regulatory accountability is through the relevant professional 
code relating to a) specific ethical failings65 or b) generic competence in service provision, sometimes 
supplemented by additional ethical obligations for advocates.66   
Between 1993 and 2021, the solicitors’ profession used this model.  Aspiring solicitors took a vocational Legal 
Practice Course (LPC) with a mandatory advocacy component.67  Some LPCs add elective advocacy modules 
but the mandatory component is normally limited to activities within (iv) above.  In 2013, the LETR large-scale 
review of education and training across all the regulated professions expressed concern about this. Solutions 
suggested, but not implemented, were to train and license lower courts rights of audience separately or to move 
them into a reinforced work experience requirement.68   
The level of skill achieved in the LPC is intended to be supplemented by:  
 
64 Or in some cases, by their employer. 
65 As, for example, misleading the court, which can occur in both advocacy and litigation. 
66 Bar Standards Board, The Bar Standards Board Handbook (2nd edn, London: Bar Standards Board 2020) 
available at https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/for-barristers/bsb-handbook-and-code-guidance/the-bsb-
handbook.html, CD7; CILEx Regulation ‘CILEx Code of Conduct’ CILEx Regulation (No date) available at 
https://cilexregulation.org.uk/code-of-conduct/ (there is an additional code of conduct for advocates);  Cost 
Lawyer Standards Board ‘Cost Lawyer Code of Conduct’ Costs Lawyer Standards Board  (2018) available at 
https://clsb.info/download/code-of-conduct/?wpdmdl=1333&refresh=5eb3db98d37a21588845464, principle 4; 
Intellectual Property Regulation Board ‘Code of Conduct’ Intellectual Property Regulation Board (2015) 
available at https://ipreg.org.uk/pro/regulations/code-conduct (a separate code covers advocates). 
67 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Legal Practice Course Outcomes 2019’ Solicitors Regulation 
Authority (2019) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/students/lpc.page. 
68 J Webb and others Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services Education and Training Regulation in 




a) experience, as an ‘assistant’ (ii) above), in a tribunal or by observing others, during the two-year 
period of work experience69 and  
b) 18 hours of mandatory simulated ‘advocacy and communication’ experience during the 
Professional Skills Course (PSC).70 This is taken during the two-year period (and paid for by the 
employer). It culminates in a ‘skills appraisal’ that is a formative, rather than summative 
evaluation.71  
Quantitatively, then, solicitors already spend less classroom time than do barristers or legal executives to acquire 
identical lower court rights of audience.  Even this, however, may have some informational value about what 
witness examination is, how it differs from other forms of advocacy, and the risks inherent in underperformance.  
Qualitatively, clearly, mere classroom time is no guarantee of competence in the messy and pressured real-world 
environment.  The expectation, therefore, is that it will be built on during the two- year period of work 
experience at item b).  Its desired outcome is that ‘On completing the training period, trainee solicitors should be 
competent to exercise the rights of audience available to solicitors on admission’. They should be provided with 
tasks that ‘enable them to grasp  … dealing with witnesses appropriately’.72   It is acknowledged that such 
experience will normally be as an ‘assistant’ (ii above) – although, as we have seen this is unlikely to include 
witness examination – or through observation, which might.73  While observation is a key learning tool,74 and 
may facilitate ‘grasping’, this is not the same as being able to perform. Evidence suggests that trainee solicitors 
do not feel that the normal range of work experience equips them to be competent in advocacy.75   
 
69 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘What Is a Period of Recognised Training’ Solicitors Regulation Authority 
(May 2020) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/trainees/period-recognised-training/your-period-recognised-
training/what-is-a-period-of-recognised-training/. 
70 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Professional Skills Course (PSC) - Written Standards’ Solicitors Regulation 
Authority (No date) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/trainees/professional-skills-course-providers/psc-
written-standards/. 
71 Some providers have, in addition, incorporated elective courses leading to solicitors’ rights of audience in the 
higher courts (see above, n 8).  This will not be possible in the future. 
72 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Practice Skills Standards’ Solicitors Regulation Authority (May 2020) 
available at https://www.sra.org.uk/trainees/period-recognised-training/managing-trainees/practice-skills-
standards/. 
73 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Trainee Information Pack (2019 Regulations)’ Solicitors Regulation 
Authority (11 December 2019) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/trainees/resources/trainee-information-
pack/trainee-information-pack-2019-regulations/. 
74 Particularly emphasised by members of the judiciary in Hunter, Jacobson and Kirby, above, n 13, para 5.1. 
75 Jane Ching and Pamela Henderson, ‘Pre-Qualification Work Experience in Professional Legal Education: 
Report’ Solicitors Regulation Authority (2016)  available at http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/28867/ ‘Pre-
Qualification Work Experience in Professional Legal Education: Appendices’ Solicitors Regulation Authority 
(2016) available at http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/28870/. 
 
 
A great deal of weight, therefore, currently rests on the PSC. Although it is almost certainly unconscious, the 
distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘competence’ factors is apparent in the difference between the PSC’s rights 
claim that successful students should ‘be able to exercise the rights of audience available on admission’ and the 
demand that on qualification they should be ‘competent’ to do so [my italics]. In the SRA’s new model the level 
of competence expected at qualification in all the activities listed in the competence statement, is ‘Acceptable 
standard achieved routinely for straightforward tasks …’.76 What is ‘straightforward’ is clearly subject to 
argument.  Because witness examination appears in the competence statement, however, we must assume that 
the scope of competence includes appearing in at least some kinds of trial in the lower courts. 
In the new regime, however, the PSC is to be abandoned.  
A mandatory two year period of work experience is retained, but is diluted in the sense that it must merely allow 
candidates ‘opportunities to develop’ ‘some or all’ of the required competences (presumably, therefore, the 
minimum is two).77  Although SQE 2 is pitched, unlike the LPC, at the level expected at the point of 
qualification, many will take it before then.78  As a measure of actual competence at the temporal point of 
qualification, it is, therefore, critically flawed.  
At a global level, many legal professions whose members acquire rights of audience on qualification are not 
required to undergo BTE training or assessment79  in advocacy. In England and Wales, however, the stakes are 
rather different.  The other professions with whom solicitors are in direct, state-mandated competition expend 
time and resource in developing and assessing the competence of their advocates using BTE vocational 
education.  If solicitors could compare badly with McKenzie Friends in the new regime, how much worse might 
they compare with a member of another profession who can point to BTE training and assessment in witness 
examination as a visible contribution to acquisition of competence? 
 
76 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Threshold Standard’ Solicitors Regulation Authority (2015) available at 
http://www.sra.org.uk/threshold/. 
77 Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Qualifying Work Experience for Trainees’ Solicitors Regulation Authority 
(May 2020) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/trainees/qualifying-work-experience/qualifying-work-
experience-trainees/. 
78 A survey of 53 City law firms suggested that 28% would require both parts of the SQE to be completed before 
entry into the firm: A Hussain ‘City Law Firms Give Insights into SQE Plans’ Legal Cheek (9 April 2020) 
available at https://www.legalcheek.com/2020/04/city-law-firms-give-insights-into-sqe-plans/. 
79 For an exception, see H Rothe and R Møller Madsen ‘The Danish Bar and Law Society’ The Danish Bar and 
Law Society (2009) available at 
https://www.advokatsamfundet.dk/Service/English/Publications/Leaflets%20reports%20and%20rule%20of%20
law%20programme.aspx, p 7. 
 
 
Mandatory BTE education sets the conditions for competence and provides information about the demands of 
performing the skills well, rather than conferring total competence itself.  The regulator, if called upon to 
sanction an advocate, is entitled to rely on those benchmarks as a starting point. The advocate cannot claim not 
to know what competent performance entails. In relation to witness examination, that message has hitherto been 
transmitted to aspiring solicitors through the LPC and PSC and, with less assurance of clarity, through the two-
year period prior to qualification.  The shift in the SRA’s proposals will mean that it will not be the regulator, or 
an educational provider, who sets the BTE standard, but the individual and their employer.  Whether that 
standard matches the SRA’s expectations will be a question of ATE investigation.80 In the next section, we 
consider the final key factor in the network and, in particular, the SRA’s justification for shifting the 
responsibility for acquiring competence in witness examination back to the profession. 
 
THE THIRD KEY FACTOR: REGULATORY ACCOUNTABILITY 
All regulators retain ATE responsibility for sanctioning advocates who perform unethically or incompetently.  
The previous section discussed the relationship between stakeholders and the acquisition of competence.  As 
shown in Table 1, some professions regulate by title and train all members accordingly.  Others regulate by 
activity, linking BTE training to specialist licensure.  The recent SRA consultation is telling in how it responds 
to the suggestion that specialist licensure for all rights of audience might be appropriate for solicitors: 
 
20 … [We] will require all intending solicitors to undertake a rights of audience 
assessment before admission.  
21.We recognise that solicitors have full trial rights in the lower courts and have considered 
whether we should include witness handling in the SQE assessment. We have concluded 
that we should not.81 It would be disproportionate, expensive, and out of step with most 
 
80 The SRA does, however, propose to offer supporting guidance materials and reports: Solicitors Regulation 
Authority, ‘Ensuring High Standards in Solicitor Advocacy’ Solicitors Regulation Authority (28 July 2020) 
available at https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/news/press/high-standards-solicitor-advocacy/. 
81 Oddly, para 24 indicates that plans include ‘a greater emphasis on vulnerable witness … training in … the 
SQE …’ Solicitors Regulation Authority ‘Assuring Advocacy Standards: Consultation’ Solicitors Regulation 




solicitors’ work.82 … we will therefore be piloting a role-play exercise in the form of a 
plea-only or interim application. 
22 Against this background, we have considered whether we should place a 
restriction on solicitors’ rights of audience in the lower courts until they have been assessed 
in witness handling. We take the view that we should not do so. Evidence of concerns 
relates to criminal advocacy practised in higher courts and in the youth courts,83 not the 
magistrates’ court. The risk of a broad restriction on practice in lower courts is that it could 
discourage solicitors from practising advocacy, and therefore restrict competition and 
restrict access to justice.  
23.Instead we will propose relying on solicitors’ and firms’ obligations in our code of 
conduct to undertake only the work which they are competent to perform. We will 
supplement this with guidance and support, and rigorous enforcement action where 
standards fall short.84 
 
There is no indication that the SRA changed its principles as a result of the consultation.85  The effect is that 
lower court trial advocacy is to be relegated below all other reserved activities, none of which are treated in this 
way in the SQE. It means that an element of the competence statement that is the ostensible benchmark for 
performance at qualification is not tested. Different logics are, of course, at play in paragraphs 21 and 22-23.  
These seem to be driven by a pragmatic need to compromise on the costs and complexity of BTE assessment 
when many solicitors do not appear in trials whilst, in the competitive market, being unwilling to let the rights – 
the entitlement – go.86  This is treated as the last word on the matter. 
 
82 This reflects the central dilemma of the SRA’s generalist regulatory approach to a profession, most of whose 
members are specialist.  Historically the division of labour was, as noted above, between the Bar as advocates 
and solicitors as litigators.  Although the Act largely treats both reserved activities together, the historical 
division of labour remains. There are far more litigation solicitors than solicitors who engage in trial advocacy, 
so litigation becomes the priority.  However, as the LSB has found, involvement in criminal litigation at an early 
stage has allowed solicitors to acquire their near monopoly over magistrates’ court advocacy (above, n 24). The 
problem is that all solicitors are licensed to carry out trial advocacy, whether or not at any given time, they 
actually choose to do so.  
 
84 Op cit n 81. 




The first argument is the cost-benefit analysis. The majority of advocacy in magistrates’ courts is carried out by 
solicitors, generally from smaller or specialist firms.87 Nevertheless, the SRA argues, the subcategory of lower 
court trial advocacy is carried out by a minority group of solicitors and complex and expensive to assess, 
therefore, as a lesser risk, it will not be assessed.  The SRA has, however, undercut its argument about risk by 
changing its position on youth court advocacy (a lower court).  This, as indicated above, it initially treated as a 
matter of sufficient concern to absorb into the BTE regulation of advocacy in the higher courts.88 This contrasts 
with the approach taken by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada in 2012 when developing a competence 
statement.  A series of proposed competences were rated for both frequency and risk.89  Whilst some of the 
suggested infrequent competences were discarded, others were included in the competence statement because of 
their risk.  The competence ‘Conduct simple hearing or trial before an adjudicative body’ passed the frequency 
threshold in most, but not all, jurisdictions but was also assessed as moderately or highly serious in risk.90  It 
was, therefore, included.  It is, however, only fair to say that proposals for a national assessment of this 
competence statement were later shelved, partly on feasibility grounds.91 
The second logic is closer to the language and objectives of the Act.  Despite being a minority interest, solicitors 
should not be prevented from competing with other lower court advocates and providing services to clients.  No 
mention of assuring or measuring BTE competence here, and, indeed, given the argument in the preceding 
paragraph, it would be difficult to make one.  The language is of rights rather than competence, with the 
restraining factor the regulatory accountability articulated in paragraph 23 as the obligation to exercise the right 
only if competent to do so. As we have seen, this responsibility is placed on the lawyer and his or her employer 
through DTE regulation leading to the risk of ATE sanction. In the decision to act, they are second-guessing the 
subsequent opinions of the enforcing regulator.   
The SRA’s shift of the responsibility for competence in witness examination from BTE to ATE sanction 
fundamentally changes the pull and push of the complex regulatory network.  There will, therefore, shortly be 
 
87 Solicitors Regulation Authority, Criminal Advocacy: Thematic Review above, n 13, p 17; Advocacy in the 
Solicitors Profession above n 13, para 198. 
88 A form of DTE monitoring of CPD activity will be employed instead.  Solicitors Regulation Authority, above, 
n 21. 
89 Federation of Law Societies of Canada ‘National Entry to Practice Competency Profile Validation Survey 
Report’ Federation of Law Societies of Canada (2012) available at https://flsc.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/admission6.pdf. 
90 The scale was: 3 = Moderately serious (negatively affects the client's interest or the lawyer's/Quebec notary's 
practice) 4 = Highly serious (jeopardizes the client's interest or the lawyer's/Quebec notary's practice). 
91 Federation of Law Societies of Canada ‘National Admission Standards’ Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada (2020) available at https://flsc.ca/national-initiatives/national-admission-standards/. 
 
 
two models in operation.  The norm for the regulation of rights of audience is one in which stakeholders engage 
in a complex push and pull arrangement of BTE, DTE and ATE regulation. This is best described by a 
Hohfeldian analysis that maps how those pushes and pulls operate to restrain what might otherwise appear to be 
an absolute entitlement.  The SRA’s shift changes the pull and push in a way that, it is argued, fundamentally 
weakens it.  The final part of this paper will evaluate the potential for a Waldronian approach to remedy that 
weakness, both for solicitors and all advocates. 
 
A RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS OF AUDIENCE 
A significant aspect of the rights debate is the taxonomical identification of hierarchies: the other rights or 
considerations that can ‘trump’ rights. In our context this means identifying what, if anything, can prevent a 
solicitor from exercising their right to conduct witness examination in the lower courts in the absence – from 
2021 –– of BTE experience. 
Hohfeld’s structural analysis of rights is one of form, and has not been without criticism and revision.92 In its 
simplest form, however, it is useful as a way of mapping how responsibility for the three key factors is normally 
divided between stakeholders.93  There are two primary kinds of obligations: the claim-right/duty and the 
privilege/no claim dyads, subject to alteration or removal by the secondary dyads of power/liability and 
immunity/disability.  Hohfeld is not interested in the processes, such as BTE education or assessment, that 
confer rights, or, in how rights are exercised except as (under)performance triggers the secondary dyads.  The 
most obvious example is in contract: if a solicitor contracts with a client to carry out the advocacy in a trial 
personally, that solicitor has a Hohfeldian duty to the client to so act and the client has a corresponding 
Hohfeldian claim right that the solicitor so act.   
The solicitor’s right of audience could also be envisaged as a Hohfeldian claim right against a court that has a 
correlative duty to hear the advocate.  Here the nature of the right under the Act is illustrated by the comparison 
above between the McKenzie Friend whose right is conferred by the court itself, and a lawyer who can only be 
sanctioned by the court after or during the event, by a wasted costs order or reporting to the regulator.  As 
 
92 See, for example Luís Duarte d’Almeida, ‘Fundamental Legal Concepts: The Hohfeldian Framework’ (2016) 
11 Philosophy Compass 554. 
93 W N Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning: And Other Legal Essays 
(HardPress Publishing 2012). 
 
 
Mayson points out, such ATE redress is unlikely to extend to actually overturning the result of the case.94  That 
a judge can report is assumed, and the SRA promises to reinforce this.  That process is, however, far less 
explicit in this jurisdiction than, for example, the express DTE power of the ECtHR to expel an advocate.95 
The claim right/duty analysis vis á vis the court seems to work rather better in an individual case such as that of 
the McKenzie Friend, or at the moment when the advocate first stands up before the judge.  A different 
Hohfeldian analysis seems more consistent with the overall position of the solicitor conferred with a right that 
he or she may exercise a Hohfeldian power never to exercise. This is to treat the solicitor as having a Hohfeldian 
privilege to appear in court, and no necessary duty to the court, regulator or anyone else either to do so or not to 
do so.  Where such a duty does arise, it does so through a contractual claim right conferred on a client by the 
retainer with the solicitor. In the normal course of events, courts, regulators and clients cannot compel the 
solicitor to appear (the correlative no claim of the Hohfeldian privilege).  The incompetent advocate, provided 
presumably they are aware they are incompetent, need not do so. 
Whether a right of audience is a Hohfeldian right as against the court, a Hohfeldian duty to an individual client 
or a privilege which a solicitor cannot be compelled to exercise, the regulator has, at least, a Hohfeldian power 
to deprive someone of the right, or place conditions on it as a function of its ATE regulation.96 The unethical or 
incompetent advocate therefore has a corresponding liability to have the primary claim-right or privilege altered.  
Such an alteration might be a limitation by conditions placed on a practising certificate or complete removal by 
suspension or striking off.  The effect of the SRA’s DTE link between the competence statement and the 
obligation to act only if competent in its ethical code renders the advocate liable to ATE sanction.  It is, 
however, a separate obligation: the right to act appears in one place and the obligation to act only if competent 
elsewhere.  
The regulator, in its turn, owes a duty to the umbrella regulator, the LSB, to police its regulated community and 
the LSB has a corresponding claim right that it should do so.   
 
94 Mayson The Scope of Legal Services Regulation, above, n 6, p 16. 
95European Court of Human Rights ‘Rules of Court’ European Court of Human Rights (2020) available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf, rule 36.4(b). 
96 Including the power to ‘restrict or prevent the involvement of an individual in certain activities …’ Solicitors 
Regulation Authority ‘SRA Enforcement Strategy’ Solicitors Regulation Authority (25 November 2019) 
available at https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/corporate-strategy/sub-strategies/sra-enforcement-strategy.  An example, 
albeit not in advocacy, is Solicitors Regulation Authority, ‘Eilish Adams - 313463’ Solicitors Regulation 
Authority, (27 January 2020) available at https://www.sra.org.uk/consumers/solicitor-check/313463/. 
 
 
Clearly, the regulator is enabled to act on evidence of ATE lack of competence (as is the client and the employer 
in claims in contract and tort).  Unlike the individual solicitor, however, Hohfeld is not interested in the grounds 
for exercise of the power, or the likelihood of its being exercised (which has the potential for any deterrent 
effect). The regulator’s Hohfeldian power to sanction is enshrined in the professional regulations: the regulator 
has a claim right, on behalf of the LSB and society in general, that the solicitor act competently and the solicitor 
has a duty to the regulator to do so.   
There is nothing in Hohfeld’s analysis per se that demands reciprocity between solicitor and regulator.  That is, 
that the regulator ensure that the solicitor has BTE training and assessment in advocacy to a level that equips 
them, in principle, to avoid ATE sanction from the regulator.  There is, however, likely to be such a claim 
between solicitor and employer (where there is one).  It is assumed that the regulator’s objective is not only 
ATE sanction, but also the pre-emptive prevention of incompetent advocacy in the first place.  Achieving this, 
in the absence of mandated BTE education or other assurance of competence, in this cat’s cradle of intersecting 
rights and duties depends on the pull of the DTE duty to the regulator and fear of ATE regulatory accountability 
effectively holding in check the push of the claim right to perform vis a vis the client and the court.   
One way of de-emphasising the entitlement to act that has then to be restrained by other means, would be to 
reconfigure it as a Hohfeldian privilege. Semantically this carries implications about decision making and 
responsible action, albeit, as we shall see, without the emphasis that Waldron explicitly places on these issues.  
It more closely places the BTE responsibility for competence not on mandatory BTE education, but on the 
individual solicitor and his or her employer in the way that the SRA now envisages.  In terms of stakeholders, 
the privilege/no claim analysis is also cleaner and therefore more comprehensible than the tripartite analysis 
involved in treating trial advocacy as a claim right and separating rights, competence and regulatory 
accountability into distinct obligations.  As a potential replacement term for ‘rights of audience’, ‘privilege of 
audience’ aligns semantically with the existing lawyer/client privilege, but, as the two are not coterminous, 
could be confusing. It does not do enough, however, to inhibit incompetent performance in the absence of BTE 
education and assessment. 
If a Hohfeldian analysis serves to emphasise heterogeneity and the divergence that is a characteristic of the 
modern regulatory landscape, Waldron, in his concept of ‘responsibility rights’97 is interested in homogeneity 
 




and convergence.  To this extent his responsibility right overlaps with Hohfeld’s privilege.  Waldron takes the 
notion of privilege further, however, in his attention to how and why the privilege is exercised: ‘the 
responsibility aspect is a way of informing and conditioning the individual possession and exercise of the 
right’.98  This accommodates competence as well as rights and accountability in a way that Hohfeld does not. 
Indeed, Waldron’s model prioritises responsibility for competence over entitlement to perform. For Waldron:  
 
… the claim that you have a right to do something is no answer to a criticism of the way you 
exercise your right. Or put it the other way round, having a right in and of itself does not give 
you a reason, let alone a moral reason, for exercising the right in any particular way.99 
 
Waldron does not claim that all rights are responsibility rights and, indeed, there are clearly rights for which a 
‘price’ of responsible behaviour by the actor is inappropriate.  Franke, with a focus on human dignity, sees the 
establishment of a normative ‘responsibility’, as adjudged by others, as a precursor to the grant of the right, and 
a price which may in some circumstances be ‘too high to be paid’.100  In the context of trial advocacy, when the 
risk for individual litigants and society is taken into account, this critique seems less compelling.   
The SRA has, however, by squarely placing responsibility for competent practice on the individual solicitor and 
his or her employer, clearly exacted a price for that responsibility in the shape of ATE regulatory sanction.  
Waldron claims that his model transcends ‘crude obligation-analysis’ (of, we infer, the Hohfeldian kind) to 
relate freedom with authority and to connect rights with ‘socially important functions and with dignity’.  Indeed, 
the concept of responsibility rights seems to be particularly well aligned with professional privileges 
(‘dignities’) and licences such as the right to conduct trials.  For Waldron, a responsibility right involves: 
  
(1) the designation of an important task, (2) the privileging of someone as the person to 
perform the task, making the decisions which the task requires (3) doing so in view of the 
particular interest that they have in the matter, and (4) the protection of their decision-making-
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sphere pursuant to this responsibility against interference by others and even by the state 
(except in extreme cases).101 
 
Jones Merritt and Merritt have argued that the right to practise law is itself, inherently, a responsibility right.102  
They do so, however, in the context of the unified, essentially self-regulating US legal profession, where 
lawyers benefit from some immunity from suit and have a particular role in the upholding of the constitution to 
which they are entitled by virtue of their ‘training and inclinations’.103  In this context, the lawyer monopoly 
over the ‘practice of law’ operates to ‘shiel[d] individual lawyers from direct competition [and] prevent[s] 
innovators from challenging the practices of the profession as a whole’.104  The key to their claim to the 
responsibility right lies in their analysis of Waldron’s criterion 3.  If lawyers fail to promote access to justice, 
Jones Merritt and Merritt argue, the claim to a responsibility right fails. Or Waldron’s fourth criterion applies 
and the state is entitled to ATE intervention.  In that case, their solution is to withdraw criterion 2 by imposing 
the kind of deregulation and competition that is, in England and Wales, enshrined in the Act.105  It seems likely, 
therefore, that Jones Merritt and Merritt would conclude that the practice of law in England and Wales does not 
satisfy Waldron’s criteria.  However, even in its own context, their approach seems rather too broad.  Indeed, 
Bix suggests that Waldron’s model, combining what Hohfeld termed a ‘molecular’ bundle of rights and duties, 
is more accurately a depiction of a ‘role’ rather than a species of right.106  A ‘role’ is clearly capable of 
embodying both rights and responsibilities and in the US context, regulation by activity and by title are 
coterminous.  In the context of the Act’s distinction between regulation by title and by activity, roles are, it is 
suggested, better envisaged as being closer to titles.   
In the petri dish that is the Anglo-Welsh deregulated context, it is, however, feasible to treat trial advocacy as a 
homogenous responsibility right, shared across multiple professions with heterogenous regulatory structures.  Its 
importance (criterion 1) is signalled by its status as a reserved activity under the Act, and the privileging 
(criterion 2) occurs in the statutory designation of authorised and exempt persons entitled to perform it.  As we 
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have seen, regulators and others are already entitled to impose ATE sanctions and to withdraw or limit licensure 
in those cases where complaint is warranted, although perhaps with greater readiness to intervene than Waldron 
envisages (criterion 4).  Indeed, the SRA’s new model will rely on criterion 4 as its sole means of control of 
lower court trial advocacy. To be effective, therefore, it must operate either as a deterrent fear of regulatory 
accountability, or as an ATE sanction at a time when, by definition, the damage to the individual litigant has 
already been done.  Waldron clearly expects the operation of the three prior criteria, particularly perhaps 
criterion 3, to render criterion 4 a last resort. Decisions made by advocates in trial to, for example, call or 
examine a particular witness or not, or to pursue a particular line of argument, are, problematic to second guess 
by regulators.107 Waldron acknowledges this difficulty when he articulates criterion 4 as a freedom from ATE 
sanction in most cases, rather than a pejorative liability to it.  
Criterion 3, which seems to have troubled Jones Merritt and Merritt, is the key in the context of the fight to 
acquire and then to maintain, solicitors’ claims to rights of audience.  A solicitor conducting a county court or 
magistrates’ court trial may have many different kinds of ‘interest’ in so doing, including those mentioned in 
paragraph 22 of the consultation paper: remuneration, personal aggrandisement; skill enhancement; promotion 
of access to justice; commitment to a particular client or case or asserting a position in the market against other 
professions.  The interests of both access to justice and competition are, of course, legitimated by the Act.  One 
of the concerns about McKenzie Friends, particularly in family law, is that they are driven by activism rather 
than altruism.  Some interests are clearly more morally valid than others, but any or all could be in play in 
addition to the interest based on pre-emptively established claim to special competence that Waldron prioritises.  
Indeed, in the SRA’s new regime, in the absence of required BTE training, assessment or meaningful learning 
opportunities in the workplace, there will be, in most cases, nothing from to support any such pre-emptive claim 
in witness examination.  There is very little even at present to support any such inference but the omission of the 
skill from the SQE makes the point quite stark.  The interest in competing in the market seems to have won the 
day, even though, compared to the other professions, this plan in fact weakens solicitors’ competitive position. 
The responsibility right concept facilitates the debate about the qualitative merits of competing interests in a 
way that the Hohfeldian model does not.  The Hohfeldian model is a tension field, in which rights and 
accountability are distinct, owed to different stakeholders and assumed to hold each other in check, and interest 
in and competence to act are of, if anything, subsidiary concerns.  If we see a right of audience as a (mere) 
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Hohfeldian claim-right or, more accurately, as a privilege, then much depends on the individual’s fear of the 
regulator’s ATE powers.  This fear is contingent, as are all claims of deterrence, on a belief in discovery, of 
prosecution and of application of sanctions.  The DTE reference to competence in the code of conduct bears the 
weight, of course, of other areas of legal practice, such as trade mark or welfare benefits law, that do not appear 
in the SQE, but these are not components of the statement of solicitor competence, nor are they reserved 
activities specially marked out by the Act. 
The SRA’s 2019 regulations, as we have seen, shift the weight of responsibility for competence in lower court 
trial advocacy to individuals,108 supervisors and managers109 and firms.110 Although competence and the right of 
audience are located in different parts of the rules, this model is in principle closer to Waldron’s model than it is 
to Hohfeld’s.  It is, however, unilaterally imposed, and the shift in the BTE and ATE balance may not be 
sufficiently explicit to the profession.  The profession will, shortly, be able neither to treat responsibility for 
BTE acquisition of competence as delegated to the regulator, (which has disclaimed it) or infer it from BTE 
structures that may in fact never have been capable of robustly assuring it. The SRA’s shift entitles, in fact 
obliges, the profession to take hold of the responsibility to perform competently, in the interests not only of 
effective market competition, but inherent professional dignity.111 It can do so reluctantly, or with enthusiasm.  
Treating trial advocacy as a responsibility right fosters this as it entails consciously embracing criterion 3 in the 
case of individual lawyers, firms or affinity groups, developing new ways to model and measure competence, 
interrogating different theories of practice, and the motivations for action rather than permission to act in 
individual cases and as time passes, rather than once and for all at qualification.112  It allows the profession itself 
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to drive the question of competence pro-actively, rather than relying on deterrence or ATE sanction that is too 
late to prevent the damage.  It allows the profession explicitly to determine and articulate its special interest 
(criterion 3) in the competitive market where others rely on BTE assessment. Waldron, it should be 
remembered, envisaged criterion 4, the ultimate sanction of removal of the right, as an interference with dignity 
to be exercised sparingly.  This would involve the SRA, rather more than it appears to do at present, exercising 
its powers to place targeted conditions on individuals’ licences preventing them from conducting trial advocacy, 
either at all, or until remedial training has been undergone.113  Complete suspension from practice, or striking 
off, might then be reserved for the most egregious cases, where ethics, more than competence, is at issue. The 




The divergence of the SRA from the national norm, and its potential implications in the competitive 
marketplace, have been the trigger for the discussion in this article.  That discussion, however, has led to 
conclusions that have relevance for all advocacy, and perhaps especially for those jurisdictions where 
acquisition and maintenance of competence is left to the individual lawyer, subject to ATE regulatory sanction.   
There is, I suggest, an urgent need to decouple trial advocacy from any sense of entitlement conferred by the use 
of the word ‘right’.  None of the other reserved activities are described in this language in the Act.  None should 
be.  If we re-envisage rights of audience as responsibility rights we can cut through the Hohfeldian cats’ cradle 
of intersecting rights, duties and powers pulling in different directions, with different degrees of force and 
vested in different stakeholders.  We can focus on and evaluate the relative force of the different drivers, and the 
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moral and ethical validity of interests, and continued interests, in performing effectively, rather than delineate 
their relationships.   
If, from 2021, nothing can be assumed from the BTE environment, then as is clear from the SRA 2019 
regulations, it is for the solicitors’ profession to take on that responsibility, and that can be done most robustly 
by the profession embracing Waldron’s holistic model where rights (criteria 1 and 2), competence (criterion 3) 
and regulatory accountability (criterion 4) blend.  In the new regime this will be critical if solicitors are to retain 
any credible claim to compete in the field of witness examination: in Waldronian terms, to have a justified 
special ‘interest’ in so doing.  As a model that makes it clear that society demands a price for the privilege, 
particularly in our deregulated, competitive marketplace, it is also I suggest an approach that should apply to all 
advocates, including the McKenzie Friend.  Beyond England and Wales, where the term ‘rights of audience’ 
may not be used in quite the same way, this analysis provides a way of thinking about the distinctive task of 
advocacy, with, as indicated at the beginning of this article, its implications for livelihood, family, liberty and 
sometimes life itself, that has the potential to inhibit incompetence and reinforce the role of the lawyer as a 
dignified actor for social good. 
 
